Fulfilling the Promise of Batson: Protecting
Jurors from the Use of Race-Based
Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel
Audrey M. Friedt
In Batson v Kentucky,1 the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor violates the Equal Protection Clause when he challenges
potential jurors on account of their race. In Georgia v McCollum,2
the Court extended its prohibition on race-based peremptory
challenges to defense attorneys. Basing his appeal on these cases,
Arthur S. Huey, IV sought a new trial by claiming that his own
defense attorney had violated McCollum. His request for a new
trial was granted.3 However, when Eric Boyd made the same argument, his request for a new trial was denied.4
The different outcomes of these two cases reflect a disagreement between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits about whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial when her own attorney has exercised race-based peremptory challenges. Initially, the Fifth Circuit held that a court must grant a new trial to a defendant
whose attorney exercised unconstitutional peremptories.5 However, in Mata v Johnson,6 it recharacterized its decision, holding
that a court must "choose that course of action that [it] believe[s]
will do the least damage to the system and to the peoples' perception of it." The Seventh Circuit, also professing a concern for the
t

B- 1995, University of Toronto; J.D. Candidate 1998, The University of Chicago.
476 US 79, 89 (1986) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the state's case against a black defendant.").
2 505 US 42, 59 (1992) ("We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant
from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges."). The Court has also extended the prohibition against discriminatory
peremptory challenges to litigants in a civil trial. Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co, 500
US 614, 616 (1991).
UnitedStates v Huey, 76 F3d 638, 639 (5th Cir 1996).
UnitedStates v Boyd, 86 F3d 719, 724 (7th Cir 1996).
Huey, 76 F3d at 641 (After concluding that the trial court had erred when it did not
find a Batson violation, the court held that "[sluch error requires a new trial .... ").
6 99 F3d 1261, 1270-71 (5th Cir 1996), vacated in part on rehearing, 105 F3d 209 (5th
Cir 1997). Mata involved an ad hoe agreement between the prosecution and defense to exclude all black veniremembers from the jury without using peremptory challenges. However, the Mata court implied that courts should follow its approach whenever veniremembers have been excluded from a jury on the basis of race. 99 F3d at 1270.
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integrity of the criminal justice system, held that courts should
never grant new trials to defendants who complain about unconstitutional peremptory challenges exercised on their own behalf.7
Both circuits emphasize the integrity of the justice system as if it
were a principle independent of the equal protection rights of defendants and jurors. This is troublesome because the Supreme
Court's decisions regarding race-based peremptory challenges indicate that the integrity of the criminal justice system depends,
at least in part, on the system's ability to protect participants'
constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that, by depriving defendants and jurors of their equal protection rights,
race-based peremptory challenges harm defendants, jurors, and
the criminal justice system. In response to these three harms,
the Court has created a scheme of protections. This scheme, however, does not provide a perfect solution. Its principal weakness is
its failure to provide adequate protection for prospective jurors.
In Powers v Ohio,9 the Court recognized that because jurors
face financial, legal, and informational barriers, they cannot effectively protect themselves from discriminatory peremptory
challenges. The Court's solution to this problem was to grant
third party standing to defendants and prosecutors to raise Batson claims on behalf of excluded jurors. This approach, however,
leaves excluded jurors with no practical way to assert their constitutional rights when a defense attorney uses race-based peremptory challenges. The defense attorney is acting as the agent
of the defendant when she violates Batson. Therefore, the defendant is an inappropriate representative of the excluded jurors.
Conversely, the interests of the prosecutor and the excluded jurors are aligned; they all have an interest in preventing the defendant from improperly excluding jurors for the purpose of
gaining an advantage at trial. However, while the prosecutor is
an appropriate representative of jurors who have been improperly
excluded by the defense attorney, prosecutors rarely raise Batson
challenges. °
This Comment argues that courts should adopt the "No New
Trial Rule" followed by the Seventh Circuit. Defendants should

Boyd, 86 F3d at 724 (holding that "the exercise of a peremptory challenge by the defense, in violation of Batson and McCollum, does not entitle the defendant to a new trial

10

See Batson, 476 US at 86-87.
499 US 400,414-15 (1991).
See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice:What We Have Learned About Batson

and Peremptory Challenges,71 Notre Dame L Rev 447,458 (1996).
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not be rewarded with a new trial for their own unconstitutional
behavior. Furthermore, excluded jurors are best served by a rule
that does not encourage defendants to violate jurors' equal protection rights. Finally, the No New Trial Rule preserves the integrity of the criminal justice system by preventing manipulation

of the system by defendants. By itself, however, the No New Trial
Rule provides insufficient protection for jurors. Therefore, the
Rule should be supplemented by an obligation on the part of
judges to actively protect the interests of jurors by initiating Batson hearings sua sponte whenever the circumstances would permit a prosecutor to do so. This sua sponte obligation will also enhance the integrity of the criminal justice system by signaling the
courts' commitment to uphold the Constitution.
Part I of this Comment reviews the Supreme Court cases
that have imposed constraints on peremptory challenges in an effort to safeguard the equal protection rights of defendants and jurors and to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Part II discusses the problems that arise when a defense attorney
uses race-based peremptory challenges. Part III criticizes the approaches put forward by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Finally,
Part IV proposes that courts should not grant defendants new
trials because of their own attorneys' Batson violations. It further
proposes that this No New Trial Rule should be combined with a
sua sponte obligation on the part of judges to actively protect the
rights of jurors. This proposal will protect the rights of jurors and
the integrity of the criminal justice system without rewarding defendants for exercising unconstitutional peremptory challenges.
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Peremptory challenges allow parties to exclude jurors who
cannot be excluded through a challenge for cause. The Supreme
Court has concluded that peremptory challenges serve two beneficial purposes: they produce a more impartial jury than could be
achieved through challenges for cause alone, and they help reassure parties that the jury is not biased against them." Although
there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges,' the
Supreme Court has characterized the peremptory challenge as
"one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused."'
See Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202,219 (1965).
Stilson v United States, 250 US 583, 586 (1919) (There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges."),
cited with approval in Swain, 380 US at 219, and Batson, 476 US at 91.
"Swain, 380 US at 219, quoting Pointerv UnitedStates, 151 US 396, 408 (1894).
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The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed the importance of peremptory challenges, holding that "the erroneous denial of a criminal
defendant's right of peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal." 4
Despite their importance in ensuring a fair trial, however,
peremptory challenges have fallen into disrepute. 5 Ironically, the
unlimited discretion historically conferred by peremptory challenges in order to facilitate the selection of an impartial jury also
provides an opportunity for race and sex discrimination. In Batson, the Court found that the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges causes three harms. First, discriminatory challenges
harm de-fendants by depriving them of their right to a jury selected according to nondiscriminatory criteria. 6 Second, such
challenges harm potential jurors by excluding them from participation in the legal system solely on the basis of their race or sex.' 7
Finally, discriminatory peremptories harm the integrity of the
criminal justice system by "undermin[ing] public confidence in
the [system's] fairness." 8 As the Court subsequently explained,
discriminatory jury selection "casts doubt over the obligation of
the . . . court to adhere to the law . . . ., In a series of cases
starting with Batson, the Court has limited the exercise of peremptory challenges in an attempt to eliminate these three harms.

14 United States v Annigoni, 96 F3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir 1996). For arguments supporting the preservation of peremptory challenges, see, for example, Jennifer Lee Urbanski, Casenote, Georgia v. McCollum ProtectingJurorsFrom Race-Based Peremptory Challenges But Forcing Criminal Defendants to Risk Biased Juries, 24 Pac L J 1887 (1993)
(criticizing McCollum*for limiting the use of peremptory challenges by defendants);
Sharon Leigh Nelles, Note, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to the CriminalDefendant's Use
of Peremptory Challenges:The Demise of the Challenge Without Cause, 33 BC L Rev 1081
(1992) (discussing the importance of the peremptory challenge for criminal defendants and
the erosion of this device by the Batson line of cases).
"5For example, in Minetos v City University of New York, 925 F Supp 177, 183 (S D
NY 1996), a district court found that peremptory challenges "by their very nature, invite
corruption of the judicial process." The court went on to hold that "peremptory challenges
per se violate equal protection." Id at 185.
For proposals to abolish peremptories, see, for example, Nancy S. Marder, Beyond
Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex L Rev 1041 (1995) (discussing the pros and cons of allowing peremptory challenges in light of the various functions of juries and concluding that peremptory challenges should be eliminated); Jere W.
Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate
Failureto Eradicate Invidious Discriminationfrom Jury Selection, 43 DePaul L Rev 625
(1994) (analyzing the development of peremptory challenges and suggesting that peremptory challenges be abolished).
16 476 US at 86-87.
11 Id at 87.
"

Id.

Powers,499 US at 412.
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The Court first addressed racial discrimination in jury selection over one hundred years ago in Strauderv West Virginia." In
that case, the Supreme Court held that racial discrimination in
selecting members of the venire violates the equal protection
rights of black defendants.2" In discussing the purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court referred to the rights of both
defendants' and jurors.23 The Court's holding, however, was focused on the rights of defendants.
Ninety years later, the Batson Court extended Strauder's
prohibition on discriminatory venire selection to the use of peremptory challenges in jury selection. In Batson, the Court held
that when a prosecutor uses race-based peremptory challenges,
she violates the Equal Protection Clause.' The Court also held
that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial
discrimination on evidence solely from within the defendant's
own trial. It thereby overruled part of Swain v Alabama, an
earlier decision that barred discriminatory peremptory challenges, but required a very high level of proof from defendants
alleging discrimination.2" The Batson Court established the following procedure for proving Batson violations: (1) the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) the prosecutor
attempts to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the challenge; and (3) the court determines whether the challenge was in
fact discriminatory." The Court justified the more lenient burden
of proof by noting that the right to exercise peremptory chal-

- 100 US 303 (1879).
21

Id at 310.

' Id (holding that the West Virginia statute "amount[ed] to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put up on trial for an alleged offence").
Id at 308 (declaring that "[tihe words of the [Fourteenth] [Ahmendment... contain
... the right to ... exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society").
24

476 US at 89.
Id at 96.

476 US at 100 n 25. The Swain Court held that a defendant could not establish discriminatory use of peremptory challenges from the record of a single case. Instead, the defendant had to show that:
2Batson,

the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever
the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, [wals responsible for the
removal of Negroes who ha[d] been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who ha[d] survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes
ever serve[d] on petit juries ....
380 US at 223. See also Batson, 476 US at 92 (characterizing the Swain burden of proof as
"crippling").
27 476 US at 93-98.
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lenges is merely statutory and hence subordinate to the constitutional requirement of equal protection.28
In Batson, the Court explicitly listed the reasons for curtailing prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges: protection of the
rights of defendants and jurors, and the need to safeguard the integrity of the justice system. The Court stressed the interrelatedness of the three harms, stating that "[public] respect for our
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if
we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because
of his race." 0 Thus, according to the Court, the integrity of the
criminal justice system depends on the enforcement of defendants' and jurors' equal protection rights.
In 1991, the Supreme Court expanded Batson's prohibition of
race-based peremptories and shifted the focus to jurors' rights. In
Powers v Ohio, the Court held that "a criminal defendant may
object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded
jurors share the same race."31 The Court reasoned that allowing
defendants to object to the exclusion of jurors of a different race
could provide an effective method of protecting jurors' rights. 2
Later the same year, in Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co,3 the
Court prohibited race-based peremptories in civil trials. The
Court stated that regardless of whether the discrimination takes
place in a civil or criminal proceeding the injury to the juror is
the same.34 The Court used a "two-part analysis"35 in both Powers
and Edmonson: first, it determined that race-based peremptory
challenges by prosecutors and private litigants violate the equal
protection rights of excluded jurors;" second, it held that criminal
defendants and civil litigants each have third party standing to
assert the rights of excluded jurors. Thus, in both cases, the
Court found an equal protection violation and standing. The need

2Id
2

at 98.

Id at 86-87.
Id at 99.

31 499 US at 402.

"Id at 414 ("IT]here can be no doubt that petitioner will be a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons' rights.").
500 US 614, 616 (1991).
Id at 619.
Id at 618.
Powers, 499 US at 409 (holding that the discriminatory exercise of a peremptory
challenge by a prosecutor violates excluded jurors' equal protection rights); Edmonson,
500 US at 618-19 (holding that the discriminatory exercise of a peremptory challenge by a
civil litigant violates excluded jurors' equal protection rights).
"Powers, 499 US at 415 (holding that criminal defendants have third party standing);
Edmonson, 500 US at 630 (holding that civil litigants have third party standing).
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to vindicate the rights of improperly excluded jurors justified both
extensions of Batson.
In Powers, the Court set out the test for determining whether
to grant third party standing to a litigant:
[11 The litigant must have suffered an "injury in fact," thus
giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; [2] the litigant must have a
close relation to the third party; and [3] there must exist
some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or
her own interests."
The Powers Court held that a defendant seeking third party
standing on behalf of improperly excluded jurors satisfies all
three parts of this standing test. First, because the fairness of the
process is cast into doubt, the defendant suffers an injury when
the prosecutor discriminatorily excludes members of the venire
from the jury.39 Second, "[v]oir dire permits a party to establish a
relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors." The defendant
and the excluded juror have a "congruence of interests" because
they share an interest in eliminating racial discrimination from
the courtroom." The Powers Court concluded that because the defendant satisfies this prong of the test, "it [is] necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise the rights of the juror."4
Third, although an excluded juror has standing to bring suit on
her own behalf,42 the Court found that, as a practical matter, jurors cannot adequately protect their own interests.' In order to
obtain injunctive or declaratory relief from the actions of an individual prosecutor, the excluded juror faces the difficult task of
proving that the discrimination against her is likely to recur."
Furthermore, individual jurors have little incentive to bring suit
because the "financial stakes" are low, and the "economic burdens
of litigation" are substantial." Thus, because all three parts of the
third party standing test were satisfied, the Powers Court concluded that criminal defendants have standing to vindicate the
rights of excluded jurors."
499 US at 411 (citations omitted).
Id at 411-13.
4 Id at 413-14.
Id at 414.
Carterv Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 US 320,329-30 (1970).
Powers, 499 US at 414-15.
Id at 415.
Id.
The Court made a similar argument in Edmonson, concluding that private litigants
have third party standing to raise the rights of jurors excluded from a civil trial. Edmon-

1318

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[64:1311

Both Powers and Edmonson continued the Supreme Court's
pattern of discussing harm to the integrity of the justice system
in the context of equal protection violations. For example, the
Powers Court explained that "[aictive discrimination by a prosecutor during [the jury selection] process condones violations of the
United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted
with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury's
neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law." 7 Such statements reflect the Court's increasing emphasis on the rights of jurors and the harm that violations of jurors' rights cause to the
criminal justice system.
Edmonson resolved an additional issue-whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants is a "state action" subject to the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding that
peremptory challenges are "a right or privilege having its source
in state authority."" Thus, private litigants are state actors when
they exercise peremptory challenges.49 A factor in the Court's decision was the "extent to which [litigants] rel[y] on governmental
assistance and benefits."0 The Court noted that "[t]he trial judge
exercises substantial control over voir dire in the federal system."5 ' This observation highlights the fact that both the powers
and the responsibilities of individual parties are directly derived
from those of the courts.
Relying on Powers and Edmonson, the Supreme Court held,
in Georgia v McCollum,5" that the Constitution prohibits criminal
defendants from exercising race-based peremptory challenges.
The Court found that, regardless of which party uses them, racebased peremptory challenges violate the equal protection rights of
jurors and damage the integrity of the justice system.5 3 The Court
also found that a defense attorney's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action.5 4 Finally, the Court reasoned that
prosecutors have third party standing to raise the claims of imson, 500 US at 629-30.
4' 499 US at 412. See also Edmonson, 500 US at 628 ("Race discrimination within the
courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there.
Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic
government from becoming a reality.").
500 US at 620.
Id at 627-28.
'0 Id at 621.
"Id at 623.
505 US 42, 59 (1992).
Id at 48-50.
Id at 50-55. The Court's analysis closely resembles the discussion of state action in
Edmonson. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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properly excluded jurors.5 5 In this way, the Court extended Batson to encompass the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense.
Once again, the Court rested its decision on the equal protection rights of excluded jurors. The opinion noted that
"[r]egardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there
can be no doubt that the harm is the same-in all cases, the juror
is subjected to open and public racial discrimination."5 6 The Court
also voiced concern for the integrity of the justice system, stating
that "[slelection procedures that purposefully exclude AfricanAmericans from juries undermine public confidence [in the verdict]--as well they should."57
The Court has not yet considered whether a court may permit a defendant to challenge her conviction because her own attorney used race-based peremptory challenges. In order to resolve
that issue, a more detailed description of the harms caused by a
defense attorney's Batson violation is required.
]I.

A DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S BATSON VIOLATION AND THE
THREE HARMS

Taken together, these Supreme Court cases prohibit prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civil litigants from exercising racebased peremptory challenges. They also grant defendants, jurors,
prosecutors, and civil litigants third party standing to raise Batson claims on behalf of excluded jurors. This framework aims to
safeguard the rights of defendants, the rights of jurors, and the
integrity of the criminal justice system. However, the fact that jurors must rely on others to raise their Batson claims5 8 limits the
effectiveness of these safeguards. Because prosecutors rarely object to peremptory challenges, the McCollum Court's grant of
third party standing to prosecutors does not provide jurors with
adequate protection from race-based peremptory challenges by
defense attorneys.5 9 This failure to protect the constitutional
rights of jurors also damages the integrity of the criminal justice
system. Judges could ameliorate these harms by raising Batson
claims sua sponte.

Id at 55-56. The Court employed the same three-part test for standing that was used
in Powers and Edmonson. See notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
" Id at 49.
57

Id.

See Powers, 499 US at 414-15.
See note 10 and accompanying text.
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A. Batson's First Harm: The Equal Protection Rights
of Defendants
Discriminatory peremptory challenges by defense attorneys
do not implicate the first harm identified by Batson. When a defense attorney uses a race-based peremptory challenge, she acts
as an agent of the defendant. By making a discriminatory challenge through her attorney, the defendant waives the right to a
jury selected by nondiscriminatory means. 0 Therefore, the defense attorney does not violate the defendant's equal protection
rights.
Two principles protect defendants from their own attorneys.
First, a defendant has the right to represent herself pro se if she
does not wish to be bound by her attorney's decisions.61 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that defendants generally
benefit from entrusting their defense to a legal expert.62 Second, if
a defense attorney's unreasonable decisions prejudice the defendant's case, the defendant can have her conviction set aside for
ineffective assistance of counsel.6 3
B. Batson's Second Harm: The Equal Protection Rights of
Excluded Jurors
In contrast to defendants, jurors do suffer a violation of their
equal protection rights when a defense attorney uses improper
peremptory challenges. As the Supreme Court explained, while
"[an individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury... he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race."" Furthermore, the Court
noted that, "with the exception of voting, for most citizens the
honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process."6 5 In addition, as the
Supreme Court observed as early as 1879, the exclusion of venirepersons from the jury because of their race is practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferi-

Boyd, 86 F3d at 721-22 ("Boyd had a right to the verdict of a jury chosen without regard to race, but his lawyer waived that right on his behalf.").
61Farettav California,422 US 806, 819 (1975) ("'The Sixth Amendment grants the accused personally the right to make his defense.").
' Id at 834 ("It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.").
'See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 691-92 (1984) ("jAny deficiencies in
counsers performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective

assistance ....
").
Powers,499 US at 409.
Id at 407.
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ority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others."66 The equal protection
rights ofjurors have played an increasingly prominent role in the
Supreme Court's peremptory challenge jurisprudence.7
As the Court observed in Powers, excluded jurors cannot effectively protect themselves against Batson violations." Jurors
cannot object at the time of the exclusion because they are not
parties to the jury selection process.69 Therefore, jurors have no
opportunity to pursue the only remedy that would truly put them
in their rightful position-that is, to be seated on the jury subsequent to a successful Batson challenge. Once the trial has begun,
the only available remedy is a new trial. This remedy attempts to
correct the harm to jurors as a group, but it does nothing to make
the individual juror whole.
In addition to being unable to object at the time of the exclusion, jurors face severe obstacles in obtaining declaratory or in0 Because jurors do not usually face
junctive relief."
repeated discrimination, they are generally not entitled to an injunction.7 '
Furthermore, although at least one class action suit has challenged discriminatory procedures for selecting venires, 2 veniremembers excluded from a jury will probably be unable to proceed
as a class. 3 For these reasons, excluded jurors are not in a good
position to safeguard their own equal protection rights against
race-based peremptory challenges.
The Court's solution to this problem has been to grant prosecutors standing to assert the rights of excluded jurors.74 However,

Strauder, 100 US at 308.
See Powers, 499 US 400; Edmonson, 500 US 614; McCollum, 505 US 42. For a brief
discussion of these cases, see Part I.
499 US at 414-15.
Id at 414.
"A Westlaw search conducted on September 8, 1997 yielded only one case in which an
excluded juror has challenged discriminatory jury selection practices. In Shaw v Hahn, 56
F3d 1128 (9th Cir), cert denied, 116 S Ct 418 (1995), a black woman who was excluded
from a jury by peremptory challenge brought suit against the party that exercised the
challenge, alleging that the peremptory violated her equal protection rights. However, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit on the grounds that the issue was precluded by the ruling, in the original case, that the peremptory challenge was
based on race-neutral reasons. 56 F3d at 1131.
71 See Powers, 499 US at 415.
"See Carter v Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 US 320 (1970).
For example, it is unlikely that enough veniremembers will be excluded to satisfy
the numerosity prerequisite for a class action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See FRCP 23(a)(1) (A class action may proceed only if "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.").
' McCollum, 505 US at 56.
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this solution is inadequate because prosecutors rarely make Batson objections. A survey of reported cases decided after McCollum
reveals that between June 18, 1992 (when McCollum was decided), and December 31, 1993, prosecutors raised only 4.25 percent of all reported Batson challenges. "5 Prosecutors, thus, provide little protection for jurors' rights. 6 Therefore, McCollum's
solution is inadequate.
C. Batson's Third Harm: The Integrity of the Criminal
Justice System
When a defense attorney uses race-based peremptory challenges, there are two potential threats to the integrity of the
criminal justice system. First, as the Supreme Court has consistently noted, the integrity of the criminal justice system suffers
when defendants or jurors are denied equal protection of the law.
In Powers, the Court insisted that discrimination by a prosecutor
during jury selection creates public cynicism toward the jury system.77 It further observed in McCollum and Edmonson that the
same damage results whether a criminal defendant or a private
litigant exercises the discriminatory challenge.78 Thus, the Supreme Court's peremptory challenge decisions emphasize that the
integrity of the criminal justice system depends on the system's
ability to protect the constitutional rights of its participants.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits identify a second threat to
the integrity of the criminal justice system-allowing a guilty defendant to "bootstrap his own violation of Batson into a new
trial."79 Because a defendant's attorney acts as her agent, a court
'
88.20
"
equal

Melilli, 71 Notre Dame L Rev at 458 (cited in note 10). Criminal defendants made
percent of the objections. The remaining objections were made by civil litigants. Id.
This is not to imply that prosecutors and defense attorneys necessarily commit an
number of Batson violations.
499 US at 412. See note 47 and accompanying text.
For criminal defense attorneys, see McCollum, 505 US at 50 ("Just as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a conviction in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred injury selection, so is public confidence undermined where a defendant,
assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, obtains an acquittal."). For civil
litigants, see Edmonson, 500 US at 628 ("Race discrimination within the courtroom raises
serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars
the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government from
becoming a reality."). See also Batson, 476 US at 99 ("In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminaljustice system and the rule of law will be
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his
race.").
Boyd, 86 F3d at 725. The Fifth Circuit expressed the same concern (though perhaps
less colorfully) in Mata, 99 F3d at 1270 ("Mf we should grant Mata a new trial, we may do
even greater damage to the integrity of our judicial system; Mata would receive a benefit
because of an error which he or his counsel invited, although Mata has never contended
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can attribute the attorney's race-based challenges to the defendant."0 As a result, a court that reverses a defendant's conviction because the defendant's own attorney used race-based peremptory challenges grants a major victory to an undeserving defendant."' The Supreme Court, however, has not yet considered
this "bootstrapping harm" to the integrity of the justice system.
III. YES, No, AND MAYBE: Two CIRCUITS, THREE ATrEMPTS

In recent decisions, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have
adopted three strikingly different positions as to whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial because her own attorney used
race-based peremptory challenges. In United States v Huey,"2 the
Fifth Circuit held that a defendant should always get a new trial
when her attorney violates Batson. In United States v Boyd, 3 the

Seventh Circuit held that a defendant should never get a new
trial on such grounds. Then, in Mata v Johnson," the Fifth Circuit recharacterized its earlier decision and held that under these
circumstances, a defendant should sometimes get a new trial. Unfortunately, all three approaches fail to adequately protect jurors
and the criminal justice system.

that he is innocent of the crime."). The concurrence in an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion
made the point more bluntly:
Huey has gained an unwarranted advantage of the ruling as follows: 1) he uttered racial epithets in the course of committing a crime; 2) faced with mounting a defense
before some individuals whose race he had insulted, he sought to preclude their
service as jurors by requesting the court to remove all African Americans and all persons with Hispanic surnames; 3) when that request was denied, he used his peremptory strikes to preclude their service as jurors in violation of Batson; 4) although successfully purging the jury, he was nevertheless convicted; 5) he then appeals, complaining essentially of his own unconstitutional acts, and we now reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial on grounds that he created and benefited from.
Huey, 76 F3d at 642 (Jolly concurring).
The Seventh Circuit emphasizes this point. See Boyd, 86 F3d at 721-22. See also
notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
S The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of whether Batson violations that
are not remedied at trial warrant automatic reversal on appeal. This Comment assumes
that the appellate remedy for a Batson violation is automatic reversal because the Supreme Court's opinions have made that assumption. See, for example, Batson, 476 US at
100 ("If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima fade, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action,
our precedents require that petitioner's conviction be reversed."). But see Eric L. Muller,
Solving the Batson Paradox:HarmlessError,Jury Representation,and the Sixth Amendment, 106 Yale L J 93, 95-96 (1996) (arguing that, strictly speaking, Batson violations do
not qualify as fundamental errors that require automatic reversal).
76 F3d 638, 640 (5th Cir 1996).
86 F3d 719, 724 (7th Cir 1996).
99 F3d 1261, 1270 (5th Cir 1996).
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A. Huey: The Fifth Circuit's New Trial Rule
In United States v Huey, two codefendants, Arthur S. Huey,
IV, and Antonio A. Garcia, argued that their Batson rights had
been violated when Huey's attorney used race-based peremptory
challenges. At trial, Huey's attorney moved to exclude all blacks
and all people with Hispanic surnames from the venire on the
grounds that such jurors would be unable to reach an unbiased
decision because the evidence against Huey included tapes and
transcripts that contained racial epithets. The district court refused to allow these challenges for cause, but questioned the jurors as to whether they would be biased by the tapes or transcripts. None of the jurors who were questioned said that they
would be biased. Huey's counsel then used his first three peremptory challenges to strike three black members of the venire. Both
the prosecutor and Garcia's attorneys made Batson objections.
The court, however, did not require Huey's counsel to respond.
Huey's attorney then used his last two peremptories to strike
black members of the venire. Again Garcia's attorney objected to
no avail. The jury convicted both Huey and Garcia.8 5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that a court should grant a
defendant a new trial when the defendant's own attorney used
race-based peremptory challenges.8 6 Under this "New Trial Rule,"
the court found that Huey's attorney had violated Batson, and
therefore granted a new trial to both defendants.8 7
In keeping with the Supreme Court's recent emphasis, the
Fifth Circuit based its decision on the harm to excluded jurors.
The court cited McCollum for the proposition that excluded jurors
suffer the same harm whether it is the prosecution or the defense
that discriminates against them.8" It reasoned that "the rationale
articulated in Powers for holding that a defendant has standing
to raise [Batson] claim[s] on behalf of prospective jurors is equally
cogent and applicable in this situation."8 9 Therefore, the court
granted both Huey and Garcia a new trial. "[O]ily by repudiating
all results from such a trial," the court explained, "can public confidence in the integrity of this system be preserved ....
."
This New Trial Rule ignores the fact that a Batson violation
by a defense attorney is attributable to the defendant herself.
When the defense attorney decides to exercise peremptory chal76 F3d at 639-40.
Id at 640.
Id at 641.
Id at 640, citing McCollum, 505 US at 49.
76 Fd at 640.
Id at 641.
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lenges in a racially motivated manner, she waives her client's
constitutional right to be tried by a jury selected through nondiscriminatory means. Due to this waiver, the defendant is not injured through a denial of her constitutional rights. Therefore, the
defendant does not deserve a new trial.
The New Trial Rule permits defendants to champion the
rights of excluded jurors when the Powers third party standing
test is not satisfied. Huey provides no explanation for its assertion that "the rationale articulated in Powers for holding that a
defendant has standing to raise [Batson] claim[s] on behalf of
prospective jurors is equally cogent and applicable in this situation." On the contrary, the first and second prongs of the Powers
test92 are not satisfied. That is, the defendant does not suffer an
injury when she "violates" her own rights, nor do the defendant
and excluded jurors share an interest in eliminating discrimination from the trial." In fact, under the New Trial Rule, the defendant has an incentive to violate the rights of jurors in order to
plant an error as a hedge against conviction. Thus, although it
purports to protect the rights of jurors, the New Trial Rule creates perverse incentives that may actually increase the number of
Batson violations.
The most striking problem associated with the New Trial
Rule is that it harms the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Even when defendants are not trying to plant errors, the integrity of the justice system is harmed when defendants violate jurors' rights and then benefit from that violation. While the Fifth
Circuit panel did recognize the "irony in reversing Huey's conviction," 4 the concurrence put the matter more strongly, stating that
"'the integrity of the jury system!.. . is not well served by the result we reach today, because the public trust will be undermined
when a convicted criminal can win a new trial based on his own
abuse of the justice system."95
B. Boyd: The Seventh Circuit's No New Trial Rule
In United States v Boyd, Eric Boyd appealed his convictions
for three armed robberies. As in Huey, the issue was "whether [a
defense] counsel's inappropriate exercise of a peremptory challenge entitles [the defendant] to a new trial."96 During jury selec" Id at 640.
2See
note 38 and accompanying text.
See Powers, 499 US at 411-14.
Huey, 76 F3d at 641.
Id at 642 (Jolly concurring).
'6 86 F3d at 721.
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tion, Boyd's attorney used peremptory challenges to strike the
only black member of the venire. Neither Boyd nor the prosecutor
objected. The judge sentenced Boyd to six hundred and fifty
months of imprisonment." Testimony at the sentencing hearing
revealed that Boyd's attorney had acted on the basis of racial
stereotypes, and that Boyd was aware of his attorney's discriminatory reasoning.9 8
Although the Seventh Circuit found that Boyd's attorney had
violated Batson and McCollum, it refused to grant Boyd a new
trial. The court explained that "steps the court takes at the defendant's behest are not reversible,"9 even if they cause injuries
to the rights of jurors and to the criminal justice system. The
court placed great emphasis on the agency relationship between
the defendant and his attorney, explaining that "[a] lawyer is the
client's agent."'i 1 The court reasoned that, except in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel or when a personal right is involved,
a lawyer's actions are attributable to her client. The court explained that the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not a
personal one; rather, "decisions about when to challenge potential
jurors-and when not to do so-are among the tactical choices
committed to counsel."' 2 Therefore, the court held that a defense
counsel's use of discriminatory peremptory challenges does not
entitle the defendant to a new trial unless the challenges amount
to ineffective assistance of counsel.' The court affirmed Boyd's
conviction because it concluded that Boyd had waived his "right
to the verdict of a jury chosen without regard to race.", °
The court also criticized Huey's New Trial Rule. It was particularly concerned that "[m]any a defendant would like to plant

Id.
The following passage describes the sentencing testimony:
[Boyd's attorney] told the court that he believed that white jurors would defer to a
black juror's judgment about a black defendant, and counsel did not want Boyd's fate
to rest on his ability to convince a single juror. Boyd himself attributed a different
stereotype to counsel: Boyd related that counsel told him that middle class blacks
should be removed from the jury because they are especially likely to vote to convict
lower class blacks accused of a violent crime.
Id.
"Id at 722.
'Id at 724 ("Because the rule serves interests other than those of the accused, the
[Huey] court believed, a defendant can obtain a new trial by attacking his own decision.
This is a non-sequitur.").
I" Id at 721.
12 Id at 724.
" Id. When the court applied this rule to Boyd's case, it found that the challenges had
not amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
..Id at 722.
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an error and grow a risk-free trial: an acquittal is irrevocable under the double jeopardy clause, and a conviction can be set
aside."' Thus, the court worried that the Fifth Circuit's rule
would create perverse incentives for defendants. Moreover, the
court cautioned that "[gyiving a defendant a new trial because of
his own violation of the Constitution would make a laughingstock
of the judicial process."" 6 Based on these concerns about jurors'
rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system, the court
rejected the Fifth Circuit's New Trial Rule.
Boyd's "No New Trial Rule" reduces perverse incentives because it refuses to reward'0 ° unconstitutional behavior.' The rule
also enables courts to avoid awarding a new trial to a defendant
who has acted unconstitutionally. However, the No New Trial
Rule does not affirmatively safeguard jurors' equal protection
rights. It merely avoids creating perverse incentives that would
compound the problem. As in all Batson cases, jurors face serious
barriers to vindicating their own Batson rights.0 9 Furthermore,
although prosecutors have standing to raise the claims of jurors
who were improperly excluded by defense counsel, 0 prosecutors
rarely make Batson challenges. The No New Trial Rule does
nothing to provide an adequate mechanism for protecting the
equal protection rights of jurors.
In addition to providing jurors with inadequate protection for
their constitutional rights, the No New Trial Rule impairs the integrity of the criminal justice system. Although this rule saves
the system from the embarrassment of rewarding a defendant for
unconstitutional behavior, its failure to safeguard jurors' equal
protection rights has effects external to the jurors themselves. As
the Supreme Court has noted, the integrity of the criminal justice
system depends substantially on protecting defendants' and jurors' equal protection rights."'

'MId at 721-22.
' Id at 725.
"Note that the "reward" is a new trial, not an acquittal.
"Recall that, when selecting a jury, parties are state actors subject to the Equal Protection Clause. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text. See also Edmonson, 500 US at
619-20 ("Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in
most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that
its participants must be deemed to act within the authority of government and as a result,
be subject to constitutional constraints.").
" See Powers, 499 US at 414-15. See also notes68-70 and accompanying text.
.. McCollum, 505 US at 56.
. See text accompanying notes 29-30.
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C. Mata: The Fifth Circuit's Balancing of Harms Approach
In Mata v Johnson," the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue of
whether a court should grant a new trial to a defendant because
of her counsel's discriminatory jury selection practices. The facts
of Mata differ slightly from those of Huey and Boyd. In Mata, the
prosecution and defense agreed to exclude all eight of the black
veniremembers without using peremptory challenges. The trial
judge did not request a nondiscriminatory reason for the exclusions."' Thus constituted, the jury sentenced Mata to death for
the murder of a black prison guard at the Ellis Unit of the Texas
Department of Corrections, where Mata was serving a sentence
for a previous murder. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit treated the
agreement between the prosecution and the defense as a species
of peremptory challenge because "it would be ludicrous to believe
that state actors could avoid the constitutional infirmity of racebased peremptory strikes by mutual agreement."" Nevertheless,
despite this discriminatory "peremptory challenge," the court affirmed Mata's conviction." 5
The court reached its decision after recharacterizing Huey's
New Trial Rule as a "Balancing of Harms" approach. This approach concentrates exclusively on minimizing harm to the integrity of the criminal justice system. The court rejected the need to
consider harm to the rights of defendants. It agreed with the Seventh Circuit's assertion that the defendant, through defense
counsel, had waived those rights."6 The court also rejected the
need to consider the rights of jurors, reasoning that it could do
nothing "to remedy the injury to the particular veniremembers
who a decade ago were excluded from Mata's jury."" 7 The court
concluded that when a defendant appeals her conviction on the
grounds that her own attorney discriminated in selecting a jury,
the principal consideration is the integrity of the criminal justice
system." 8 Under the Balancing of Harms test put forth in Mata,
courts must "consider the facts peculiar to th[e] case, balance the
competing harms to the system, and choose that course of action

F3d 1261.
Id at 1264.
...
Id at 1269.
..Id at 1273.
l6 Id at 1270.
11Id.
"Id ("Our current concern, then, must be principally for the reputation and integrity
of the system in general.").
299
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that [they] believe will do the least damage to the system and to
the peoples' perception of it.""9
Mata illustrates the "competing harms to the system" that
will likely arise whenever a defendant challenges her own attorney's discriminatory jury selection. On the one hand, leaving racial discrimination in jury selection unremedied undermines the
integrity of the criminal justice system. On the other hand,
granting a new trial to a guilty defendant who abused the system
is also harmful. Applying its Balancing of Harms approach, the
Mata court stated that the pre-Batson agreement reached at
Mata's trial would not likely recur given that the values of Batson
had since been firmly established. As a result, the court found
that the need for deterrence was slight." The court contrasted
the situation in Mata to that in Huey. There, the decision to grant
Huey a new trial "did not significantly increase the financial or
emotional burden on the community," since there was no question
that the court would have to grant a new trial to Garcia, Huey's
codefendant."2 Thus, because the need for deterrence was low
and the community would be harmed by a reversal, the court decided not to grant Mata a new trial.
The Balancing of Harms approach collapses consideration of
harm to jurors and harm to the justice system into one inquiry.
This is possible because the integrity of the justice system depends in part on protecting jurors' rights.' However, the system's integrity also depends on preventing strategic behavior by
defendants." By considering jurors' rights within the framework
of an integrity inquiry, the Fifth Circuit justified subordinating
the rights of jurors to the system's interest in preventing an undeserving defendant from getting a new trial. The Supreme
Court, however, has always referred to three separate harms.
Therefore, courts should try to address each harm individually
and not balance one against the others. This Comment proposes
that the No New Trial Rule be coupled with a sua sponte obligation on the part of trial judges to demand race-neutral explanations for possible Batson violations. This proposed rule would
both ameliorate the harm to jurors and safeguard the integrity of
the criminal justice system.

' Id at 1270-71.
'Id at 1271.
' Id. The fact that over 20 percent of the adult residents in Walker County, where
Mata murdered the prison guard, were affiliated with the prison would have compounded
the community's emotional burden in this case. Id at 1264.
'See notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
'See notes 79-81.
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COMBINING THE No NEW TRIAL RULE WITH A JUDICIAL

OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
SUA SPONTE

Courts should not grant new trials to defendants whose own
attorneys violate Batson. A New Trial Rule would provide an incentive for defendants to violate the rights of jurors and damage
the integrity of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, defendants would benefit from the unconstitutional misconduct of their
own attorneys. On the other hand, the No New Trial Rule provides insufficient protection for jurors' rights and therefore undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system. For these
reasons, the No New Trial Rule should be accompanied by a sua
sponte obligation on the part of trial judges to request a raceneutral reason whenever they observe behavior that constitutes a
Once the judge has reprima facie case of discrimination.'
quested a race-neutral explanation, the usual Batson procedures
should be followed. If the judge finds that Batson was violated,
then she should either reinstate the improperly excluded juror or
require jury selection to begin again. If the judge finds that Batson was not violated, then the trial should proceed. By recognizing this duty to raise Batson violations sua sponte, courts affirm
their commitment to prevent "violations of the United States
Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement.""
The justification for this obligation to make sua sponte findings of prima facie discrimination is found in two sources. First,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the trial judge plays an
essential role in dismissing jurors peremptorily. For example, in
Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co, the Court stated:
Without the direct and indispensable participation of the
judge... the peremptory challenge system would serve no
purpose. By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court has not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to place its power, property, and
prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination. In so doing the

'aThe elements of a prima facie case of race discrimination are: (1) an attempt to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the venire; (2) a procedure that permits
those "who are of a mind to discriminate" to do so (peremptory challenges constitute such
a procedure); and (3) facts and circumstances that raise the inference of discrimination.
Batson, 476 US at 96.
'Powers, 499 US at 412.
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government has ... in a significant way... involved itself
with invidious discrimination. 6
Because the trial judge has the last chance to prevent the discriminatory challenge, her 7 failure to do so implicates her in the
prohibited discrimination.'
Second, all judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution. 8
In order to be faithful to this oath, trial judges should intervene
whenever an attorney attempts to violate Batson. 9 As the Supreme Court explained in Powers, "[t]he courts are under an affirmative duty to enforce the strong . . . constitutional policies
embodied in th[e] prohibition [of discrimination in jury selec-

tion].' 30

A number of district and state courts have acted sua sponte
to prevent Batson violations. 13' Furthermore, the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have implicitly supported a sua sponte obligation
by suggesting that, in some circumstances, judges should require
a race-neutral reason for all challenges of jurors who belong to a
cognizable group, whether or not a party objects." 2 Finally, sev'500 US at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted). See note 51 and accompanying
text.
'See, for example, Lemley v State, 599 S2d 64, 70 (Ala 1992) ('The notion that by allowing racial discrimination to occur, the trial judge actually becomes a part of that discrimination is... applicable to the trial judge who, in a case with racial overtones, recognizes a racial pattern to counsel's peremptory strikes yet takes no steps to inquire into
counsel's motivation.").
'Both federal and state judges are required by the Constitution to take an oath to
"support the Constitution." US Const, Art VI, cl 3. The oath for federal judges is set out in
28 USC § 453 (1994).
'See, for example, Brogden v Maryland, 102 Md 423, 649 A2d 1197, 1198 (Md Ct
Spec App 1994) (upholding sua sponte intervention by a trial judge who stated- The panel
may be acceptable to the parties, but I do not believe that the panel is acceptable to the
court. It seems to me we have a very real Batson situation here.").
"'499 US at 416.
"'See, for example, Alexis v Leporati, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 11705, *11 (D Mass)
("[This court considers that it is duty-bound to conduct a Batson inquiry whenever it finds
that circumstances themselves establish a prima facie case of discrimination."); Lemley,
599 S2d at 69 ("[T]he trial judge, as the presiding officer of the court, should take the necessary steps to ensure that discrimination will not mar the proceedings in his courtroom."); Doe v Downers Grove, 834 F Supp 244, 248-50 (N D Mll 1992) (justifying sua
sponte denial of race-based peremptory challenges), revd on other grounds by Doe v Burnham, 6 F3d 476 (7th Cir 1993); Brogden, 649 A2d at 1199 ("A trial judge need not sit idly
by when he or she observes what he perceives to be racial discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges."); New York v Nelson, 625 NYS2d 176, 214 A2d 411, 411 (NY App
Div 1995) ("The trial court properly noted, sua sponte, the prima facie existence of a Batson violation. . .."); New York v Maisonet, 618 NYS2d 718, 209 A2d 297, 297 (NY App Div
1994) ('The record supports the trial coures sua sponte determination of the existence of a
prima facie showing of gender discrimination....").
'See United States v Johnson, 873 F2d 1137, 1140 n 3 (8th Cir 1989) ("[W]here the
district court considers the issue to be close, conservation of judicial resources might well
justify inquiry of the government attorney as to the reasons for making a strike."); United
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eral commentators have recently suggested that judges should
act sua sponte to prevent the improper exercise of peremptory
challenges.'3 3
The most significant barrier to the adoption of a sua sponte
obligation is that it would contravene the principle that failure to
object constitutes waiver. Both the Seventh and the Fourth Circuits avoid intervening in jury selection absent an objection. 3 4
However, waiver concerns, while valid, are not relevant to the
scenario created by the current proposal for two reasons. First,
the Seventh Circuit's use of past cases reveals that the court is
concerned that appellate courts would be required to rule without
the benefit of a record containing contemporaneous observations.'3 5 However, a sua sponte obligation would require trial
judges to make contemporaneous observations concerning the
race-neutral reasons offered by the party exercising the challenge. Therefore, a sua sponte obligation would create a record for
the appellate court to review.
Second, waiver is an inappropriate concept where, as here,
the rights of third parties are concerned. Although our society is
committed to an adversarial system of zealous advocacy,'36 this
States v Chinchilla, 874 F2d 695, 698 n 5 (9th Cir 1989) ("It might be advisable for the
court and counsel to have a pre-selection in camera discussion in which the cognizable racial group is identified. Then during the course of jury selection, counsel could ask for a recess and explain in advance the reasons for an intended peremptory challenge of a member of that group.").
See, for example, Christo Lassiter, The O.J.Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and
White, 1 Mich J Race & L 69, 104 (1996) ("Batson... requires trial judges, upon defense
motion or sua sponte, to deny peremptory strikes by the prosecutor in a criminal case unless the prosecutor articulates a race-neutral explanation for an apparent attempt to
eliminate racial diversity in the jury."); Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1121 (cited in note 15)
("One possibility is that the judge might step in sua sponte... ."); Susan N. Herman, Why
the Courts Love Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67
Tulane L Rev 1807, 1853 (1993) ("lit seems appropriate for the trial judge to raise a Batson problem sua sponte if a prima facie case against a cognizable racial group has developed.").
'See Burnham, 6 F3d at 481 ("Under Batson, a court should at least wait for an objection before intervening in the process of jury selection to set aside a peremptory challenge."); Clark v Newport News Shipbuildingand Dry Dock Co, 937 F2d 934, 939 (4th Cir
1991) (Considering the defendant's first-time assertion of a Batson violation on appeal, the
court held that "[n]either Batson nor its progeny suggests that it is the duty of the court to
act sua sponte to prevent discriminatory exclusion ofjurors.").
' Burnham, 6 F3d at 481. See United States v Pulgarin,955 F2d 1, 2 (1st Cir 1992)
("[C]ontemporaneous objection is especially pertinent as to Batson claims."); Thomas v
Moore, 866 F2d 803, 805 (5th Cir 1989) ("Determining whether a prosecutor has acted discriminatorily in his use of a peremptory challenge depends greatly on the observations of
the presiding judge.").
'Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble, cl 2 (1996) ("As advocate, the lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."). However, the adversary system is not without exceptions. For example, judges are obligated to
raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Mount Healthy City DistrictBoard ofEduca-
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system often "fails to take into consideration the rights of third
parties." 7 When they exercise discriminatory peremptory challenges, defendants waive their own Batson rights. They should
not, however, be allowed to waive the rights of jurors. As one
commentator has suggested, "[t]he role of the trial judge38 must be
expanded if the overly zealous advocate is to be tamed."
An additional concern raised by the Seventh Circuit is that,
in view of the importance of peremptory challenges, "ijludges
should invade a party's discretion to strike potential jurors only
in narrow circumstances."" 9 While this principle is sound, a sua
sponte obligation does not grant broad discretion to the trial
judge to interfere with peremptory challenges. Rather, judges
would only intervene when a prima facie case of discrimination
exists. 4 ' A prima facie case already triggers Batson challenges by
defendants and prosecutors. Thus, the judge's sua sponte obligation interferes with peremptory challenges only to the extent already authorized by the Supreme Court.
The rule proposed in this Comment will function as follows.
When objecting to an improper challenge by the defense counsel,
the judge will stand in the shoes of the prosecutor. If the defense
attorney acts in a manner that constitutes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the judge has a duty to request a race-neutral
reason for the peremptory challenge. The judge will then rule on
the sufficiency of that reason. The judge's ruling will be reviewable on appeal, but will not constitute a reversible error. That is,
appellate judges will have a sua sponte obligation to determine
whether the trial judge's determination was erroneous. However,
appellate judges will not grant the defendant a new trial if her
own defense attorney violated Batson, even if the trial judge
erred in accepting the race-neutral explanation.

tion v Doyle, 429 US 274, 278 (1977); MC & LM Railway Co v Swan, 111 US 379, 382
(1884). They are also obligated to recuse themselves sua sponte. 28 USC § 455(a) (1994);
Christiansenv National Savings and Trust Co, 638 F2d 520, 534 (DC Cir 1982); United
States v Torkington, 874 F2d 1441, 1446 (lth Cir 1989).
"'Paul Lowell Haines, Note, Restrainingthe Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial Intervention, 65 Ind L J 445, 448 (1990).
'oId at 462.
'Burnham, 6 F3d at 481.
"See note 124 and accompanying text.
.'This obligation arises from the same sources as that of the trial judge. The appellate
judge's obligation is important because defendants will not have an incentive to raise the
issue on appeal since they will not be granted a new trial regardless of the court's decision.
Note, however, that the appellate judge will not be required to search for Batson problems
in the record. Rather, the appellate judge should confine herself to reviewing the trial
judge's ruling when the trial judge has acted sua sponte and should only review a failure
to act sua sponte when that failure is obvious from the record.
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In the case of an improper challenge by the prosecutor, the
trial judge will stand in the shoes of the defendant. Thus, a trial
judge's erroneous denial of a Batson challenge leveled against the
prosecutor will remain reviewable and reversible, regardless of
whether the challenge is raised by the defense attorney or the
trial judge. These procedures will minimize the three harms
caused by race-based peremptory challenges by defense counsel."
First, the proposed system will leave intact the defendant's
protection against her own attorney. Courts will still have an obligation to grant new trials to defendants who received ineffective
assistance of counsel.'"
Second, the proposed system will increase the protection of
jurors' rights but will not create incentives for defendants to act
strategically. The only real remedy for improperly excluded
members of the venire is for them to be seated on the jury after a
successful Batson challenge.' Therefore, it is important to provide incentives for judges to act at the time of the violation. There
are many factors that provide these incentives: the judge's professionalism and sense of duty; the judge's concern for her reputation; informal methods of judicial discipline; 45 and the appellate
court's review of the trial judge's decisions. The willingness of
trial judges to intervene sua sponte has been demonstrated in
several cases. 4 6 Because prosecutors represent jurors inadequately, this willingness is especially beneficial when the Batson
violation is committed by the defense counsel. 4 7 Therefore, a judicial sua sponte obligation will increase safeguards of jurors' equal
protection rights at the most 48crucial stage in the process: when
the harm can still be averted.
'Of course, the trial judge's vigilance will also increase protection from discriminatory peremptories exercised by the prosecutor.
See Part HA
'"See Part H.B.
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Discipliningthe FederalJudiciary:Informal Methods of
JudicialDiscipline, 142 U Pa L Rev 243 (1993) (discussing eight methods of discipline, including informal actions of the chief circuit or district judge and informal actions of peer
judges).
'"See note 131. Note that these cases have come to our attention only because the sua
sponte determination was challenged. Thus, this sampling of cases is probably underinclusive.
"See note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacy of prosecutors
as representatives of excluded jurors.
"The Ninth Circuit presents a unique twist. In a recent case, the court, sitting en
banc, held that "the erroneous denial of a criminal defendant's right of peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal." United States v Annigoni, 96 F3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir
1996). Therefore, in the Ninth Circuit, a judge's erroneous sua sponte denial of a peremptory would be reversible, but under this Comment's proposal, a judge's erroneous sua
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The proposed system would also eliminate perverse incentives for defendants. Combining the sua sponte obligation with
the No New Trial Rule will preclude a court from granting a new
trial to a defendant when her own attorney acted in a discriminatory manner. This would be true even when the judge, acting sua
sponte, erroneously concluded that the challenge did not violate
Batson. Under a rule which included the sua sponte obligation,
but not the No New Trial Rule, the defendant might still succeed
in planting an error. Although she would not have control over
whether the judge raised the issue, the defendant would still
have little to lose and much to gain from attempting to plant an
error. Therefore, perverse incentives might still exist if a new
trial were available. However, when the No New Trial Rule is
combined with the sua sponte obligation, these problematic incentives are eliminated.
Finally, the proposed system will preserve the integrity of
the criminal justice system along two dimensions. First, the No
New Trial Rule will prevent defendants from bootstrapping their
own Batson violations into a second chance for acquittal. Second,
the sua sponte obligation will enhance public confidence in the
fairness and integrity of the justice system. Judges will actually
protect jurors from having their rights violated by the judicial
system. Therefore, the integrity of the system will be increased
insofar as that integrity depends on the ability of the system to
protect the constitutional rights of its participants. Furthermore,
judges will explicitly assume the responsibility for protecting jurors and the system. That undertaking will signal trial judges'
commitment to uphold the Constitution and thus further enhance
the integrity of the system.
Although the No New Trial Rule and sua sponte obligation
will not prevent or remedy all race-based peremptory challenges,
the combined rule and obligation have significant benefits. The
proposal will eliminate incentives for defendants to violate the
rights of jurors. It will increase the protection available to excluded jurors. And finally, it will enhance the integrity of the system by protecting jurors and enforcing the explicit judicial commitment to uphold the Constitution.

sponte denial of a Batson challenge to a peremptory would be reviewable, but not reversible. This asymmetry may give judges in the Ninth Circuit a slight incentive to err on the
side of permitting peremptories. However, the incentives would be weaker in blatant cases
of discrimination, since the reputational cost of allowing the challenge would increase and
the chances of reversal would decrease. Therefore, even in the Ninth Circuit, a sua sponte
obligation would provide significant protection for jurors.
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CONCLUSION

This Comment argues that a defendant should not be
granted a new trial because her own attorney exercised racebased peremptory challenges. It further argues that judges
should have a sua sponte obligation to raise Batson challenges
when a prima facie case of discrimination exists. Together, this
No New Trial Rule and sua sponte obligation will reduce harm
both to excluded jurors and to the integrity of the criminal justice
system.
The harm jurors suffer from race-based peremptory challenges will be reduced in two ways. First, the No New Trial Rule
will avoid giving defendants an incentive to violate the rights of
jurors in order to obtain a new trial. Second, the sua sponte obligation will increase the protection available to jurors by placing
the responsibility for that protection with the vigilant trial judge.
The proposal will also enhance the integrity of the criminal
justice system in two ways. First, the No New Trial Rule will prevent defendants from benefiting from their own unconstitutional
behavior. Second, the sua sponte obligation will protect jurors
and explicitly commit judges to upholding the Constitution. By
safeguarding the equal protection rights of jurors and the integrity of the criminal justice system, the No New Trial Rule and the
sua sponte obligation help to fulfill the objectives the Supreme
Court put forth in Batson.

